Research
My work focusses on questions in democratic theory writ large. As a trained philosopher, legal scholar and mathematician, I hope to bring a new perspective to these questions by working at the intersections of political and legal philosophy, game theory, and social choice. An overview of my research projects can be found below.
Deliberation & Voting
Deliberative decision-making involves both deliberation and voting. These two decision-making methods are not only interdependent but also mutually reinforcing. In this research project, I explore the most effective ways to combine deliberation and voting in deliberative decision-making.
This research is partly funded by the Open Society Foundations as part of the project ‘Cohesion and Deliberative Decision-Making‘ at the LSE.
Publications
Multiple Juries. (with A. Poama) (Working Paper).
Introduction to the Special Issue: Deliberative Decision-Making Methods. Res Publica (with D.M. Mokrosinska) (In Progress).
Legislative Secrecy in Deliberation and Voting (with D.M. Mokrosinska) In: D.M. Mokrosinska. Secrecy and Democracy: A Philosophical Inquiry, Routledge, 2023: 83-103.
Democratic Inclusion
The right to participate in democratic decision-making has traditionally been reserved for the resident citizens of a nation-state. In this research project, I examine whether prospective immigrants and denizens (resident non-citizens) have a right to (equal) participation in democratic decision-making on, respectively, immigration and domestic laws. This research project thus sits at the intersection of democratic theory and the political philosophy of immigration.
This research is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the PPE graduate program ‘Collective Decision-Making‘ at Universität Hamburg.
Publications
Denizenship and Democratic Equality. (with D. Häuser) Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy (2024).
Democracy is assumed to require the equal political inclusion of denizens, as sustained political inequalities between members of society seemingly undermine the democratic ideal of equal freedom. This assumption is prominently expressed by Walzer’s Principle of Political Justice, according to which democratic institutions must attribute equal political rights to denizens in order to sustain their equal protection from domination and the recognition required for free agency. This paper rejects this influential assumption. We argue that denizenship constitutes a social position, in which equal freedom can be enjoyed without political inclusion on equal terms to citizens. Many denizens are citizens somewhere else, and enjoy status, rights, and protections in virtue of their external citizenship, which can protect them from domination and provide them with the recognitional basis of self-respect. The cross-border relationships between denizens and their home country, as well as between the host country and the home country, must therefore be considered when evaluating claims to political inclusion. Accepting the democratic legitimacy of the partial political inclusion of denizens allows us to focus on the most pressing political claims, such as those of refugees and stateless persons. Partial inclusion schemes can also make less restrictive immigration policies more rational and desirable for citizens.
Electoral District Design
At least 84 states around the world use geographic electoral districts to elect a set number of representative to the legislature. In this research project, I question whether electoral districts should remain geographically-defined, given the impact of the geographic definition of electoral districts on (1) democratic equality and (2) effective government. With new technologies that enable the creation of heterogeneous ‘random’ districts—where voters are randomly assigned to districts—this question has become particularly urgent, as such electoral districts could potentially better uphold democratic values.
This research is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the PPE graduate program ‘Collective Decision-Making‘ at Universität Hamburg.
Publications
Legislative gridlocks, driven by social partisan sorting, pose a significant threat to contemporary democracies. In this paper, I argue that this problem can be addressed by replacing geographic electoral constituencies, which group voters by area of residence, with heterogeneous electoral constituencies, which are based on random assignment and thus reflect the diversity of the entire electorate. I show that geographic electoral constituencies are likely to crystallise cleavages that reinforce geographic divisions, whereas heterogeneous electoral constituencies are likely to dilute deep social divisions. I argue that heterogeneous constituencies have this effect not because they suppress intergroup difference, as is commonly held, but rather because they encourage political parties to express cross-cutting social identities. The politicisation of cross-cutting social cleavages prevents social partisan sorting and moderates political conflict. Heterogeneous electoral constituencies should therefore be considered as part of an expressive institutional response to the democratic threat of legislative gridlock.
Geographic Electoral Districts and Democratic Equality. (Working Paper).
Race-Conscious Electoral Districts and Solidarity (Working Paper).
Referenda
There is a long-standing debate about the supplementary value of referenda in representative democracies. In this research project, I examine under which legal conditions referenda should be introduced in addition to parliamentary elections and how referenda should be designed. In paricular, I address questions such as (1) whether the outcomes of referenda should be legally binding, (2) whether referenda should have a quorum requirement in the form of a turnout or approval quorum, and (3) how referenda should amend the status quo.
Publications
How to Amend the Status-Quo: Reality-Aware Amendment Procedures. (with D. Grossi) (Working Paper).
Are Referendums and Parliamentary Elections Reconcilable? The Implications of Three Voting Paradoxes. Moral Philosophy and Politics 6(2), 2019: 281-311.
In representative democracies, referendum voting and parliamentary elections provide two fundamentally different methods for determining the majority opinion. We use three mathematical paradoxes – so-called majority voting paradoxes – to show that referendum voting can reverse the outcome of a parliamentary election, even if the same group of voters have expressed the same preferences on the issues considered in the referendums and the parliamentary election. This insight about the systemic contrarieties between referendum voting and parliamentary elections sheds a new light on the debate about the supplementary value of referendums in representative democracies. Using this insight, we will suggest legal conditions for the implementation of referendums in representative democracies that can pre-empt the conflict between the two methods for determining the majority opinion.
Bij het besluit om de WRR af te schaffen duiden de genoemde argumenten op noodzaak tot verbetering van de WRR in plaats van noodzaak tot afschaffing. Het gebrek aan inhoudelijke overwegingen over het ontwerp van referenda volgt een trend die is ingezet bij het instellen van de WRR. De introductie van de opkomstdrempel in de WRR geeft dit beeldend weer. Dit artikel maakt inzichtelijk hoe wijziging van de opkomstdrempel in de WRR de werking van raadgevende referenda kan verbeteren. Dit laat zien dat er mogelijkheden zijn om het niet-bindende raadgevend referendum door middel van aanpassingen een beter democratisch instrument te laten zijn.